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I theoretically analyze the eﬀects of a strengthening IPR protection and an
improvement of technology of innovation of oﬀshoring on the rate of innova-
tion oﬀshoring, rate of imitation, rate of innovation, relative wages, real wages
and domestic welfare. A North-South dynamic general equilibrium model of
trade with endogenous imitation and innovation and production oﬀshoring is
constructed. To trade with lower Southern wages, Northern ﬁrms confront the
problem of information leakage to the Southern ﬁrms and monitoring costs
if they do oﬀshore innovation and production. The model predicts that a
strengthening of IPR protection decreases the rate of innovation and the rate of
imitation but increases the rate of innovation oﬀshoring. Northern real wages
also decrease with a strengthening of IPR protection but Southern real wages
increase. It may hurt the North but beneﬁt the South. An improvement in
technology of innovation oﬀshoring increases the rate of innovation, the rate of
imitation and the rate of innovation oﬀshoring. Northern relative real wages de-
crease with such improvement but Southern real wages increase. It may beneﬁt
the North and the South.
Keywords : oﬀshoring, innovation, information leakage, productivity gap,
welfare, trade policies
JEL classiﬁcation : F12, F13, F21, F23,D43,O31
∗I am grateful to Prof. Jota Ishikawa, Prof. Taiji Furusawa and members of International Trade
and Investment seminar at Hitotsubashi University
11 Introduction
Oﬀshoring has been steadily increasing in developed countries. Starting with oﬀ-
shoring of production activity decades ago, this economic phenomenon now also
reaches higher value added and non-routinized areas, including research and develop-
ment, and the overall sphere of innovation activity.
Business media now report the oﬀshoring of innovation activity in sectors ranging
from pharmaceutical and bio-technology to computer hardware and software. An in-
creasing number refers to wholly owned innovation centers in countries such as Russia,
China and India, or sometimes even arms length sub-contracting of innovation in these
countries. Intel, for example, has labs carrying out advanced microprocessor design
work in Novosibirsk and St.Petersburg in Russia, after having bought Elbrus, a lead-
ing Russian computer technology research center and boosting its Russian research
staﬀ to over 1500. Intel also has a hi-tech development center in Bangalore, India,
working on digital signal processing, device drivers and process and chipset design,
and a major facility in Beijing, the Intel China Research Center for the development
of next-generation networking and wireless platform solutions. According to the In-
dian National Association of Software and Service Companies (Nasscom), the total
market size of this so-called knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) business in India
was around $1.2 billion in 2004, and is expected to increase substantially. Original
equipment manufacturers to whom value added resellers would oﬀshore component
manufacturing, are giving way to original design manufacturers in the Asia-Paciﬁc
region. The latter design, engineer and manufacture products from the ground up
with little input from their clients, whose major role often is to contribute the brand
name.
The primary reason for innovation oﬀshoring is the same as for oﬀshoring in
general-cost reductions. In additional to the cost saving, there are other reasons for
this phenomenon including demand and supply of scientists, technologists and knowl-
edge workers, interaction capabilities and new incentives. Demand (as deﬁned by real
gross national product in the world’s largest and most rapidly growing economies)
is doubling every 14 to 16 years, creating a host of new specialist markets suﬃ-
ciently large to attract innovation. The supply of scientists, technologists and knowl-
edge workers has dramatically increased, as have knowledge bass and access to them.
Software-based analytical, modeling, communications and market-feedback technolo-
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Figure 1: Nature of Activity Outsourcing and Oﬀshoring
gies have lowered costs and risk substantially, allowing many smaller enterprises to
participate in emerging markets. Interaction capabilities have grown. Combined
with the internet and other information technology capabilities, interactions among
technologies –including the biotech, computer, chemistry, environmental and food
ﬁelds – are growing exponentially. New incentives have emerged. Lower tax rates,
privatization, the relaxation of many national and international trade barriers, and
the lower capital investment needed in many ﬁelds have meant greater incentives for
entrepreneurs worldwide to develop and exploit advances in knowledge. New man-
agement techniques, software, and communication systems have enabled much better
coordination of highly dispersed innovation activities.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of the nature and speciﬁc kinds of activities oﬀ-
shored and outsourced to various locations. It shows that while manufacturing is the
most common form of activity oﬀshored overall, there is a signiﬁcant amount of R&D
oﬀshoring as well. It is interesting to note that R&D is the most signiﬁcant segment
in the intra-ﬁrm oﬀshoring category, i.e. to foreign aﬃliates. Apparently, when it
comes to carrying out R&D abroad it is important to safeguard proprietary business
procedures and intellectual property rights under the aegis of your own ﬁrm. Firms
match their organizational strategy and structure to the needs of innovation being
pursued. As pointed out by Teece and Chesbrough (2002), “..to organize a business
for innovation, managers must ﬁrst determine whether the innovation in question is
1See Bradhan and Jafee (2005)
3autonomous (it can be pursued independently) or systemic (it requires complemen-
tary innovations)”, and also determine whether the capabilities needed for innovation
can be easily oﬀshored or created in-house. Within the universe of oﬀshoring, the
more routine developmental activity was subcontracted to arms length parties while
more sensitive aspects were dealt with by the ﬁrm’s subsidiary. Also, ﬁrms preferred
to carry out research on “drastic” innovations, embodying a qualitative break from
attributes of previous products or processes, within the ﬁrm, while outsourcing the
search for common, marginal improvements and individual innovative elements of a
product package. On the other hand, narrowing the sample to innovative ﬁrms shows
that the more innovative ﬁrms do not oﬀshore their R&D.
To my knowledge, in terms of innovation oﬀshoring literature and product cycle
literature, there has not been any work that formally models the theoretical foun-
dation of innovation oﬀshoring. This paper provides a theoretical framework for
innovating oﬀshoring. It mainly addresses how changes in IPR protection and tech-
nology of innovation oﬀshoring alter the rates of innovation and imitation, the degree
of innovation oﬀshoring and welfare in both the home and host countries’. The lit-
erature on product cycle models has seen a revival in recent years. This literature is
based on the seminal work done by Vernon (1966) . He presents a model where new
products are ﬁrst introduced in high income countries, exports begin to other high
income countries, eventually production shifts to low income countries, and ﬁnally
the original product may be exported back to the high income country which ﬁrst
introduce it. Yet while Vernons (1966) original vision of the product cycle assigns
a central role to foreign direct investment (FDI), most of the new models capturing
his ideas use imitation as the channel of international technology transfer from an
innovating region (the North) to an imitating region (the South).
Grossman and Helpman (1991) followed the “product cycle” idea that North is
the only source of innovation (new varieties of products), and the only way South
can acquire technology is through technology transfer (imitation) from North. Both
innovation and imitation are costly activities and their levels are endogenously deter-
mined. They study the determinants of the long run rate of innovation and imitation.
An increase in labor supply in the South or a decrease in the labor requirement for
imitation generates an increase in the steady-states rate of imitation. In the North,
this raises the risk premium for innovation and also boosts the proﬁts of the surviving
monopolies. The second eﬀect dominates, raising the rate of innovation. Grossman
4and Helpman (1991)developed a similar model were innovations are higher quality
levels (the quality ladder model). An increase in the Southern labor force raises im-
itation and the number of Northern ﬁrms targeted for imitation. Innovation in the
North may rise or fall. The Grossman-Helpman product cycle models has new prod-
ucts being invented by “only” Northern ﬁrms and later directly imitated by Southern
ﬁrms.
In the Vernon cycle, Northern ﬁrms move production to the South by forming
subsidiaries there before imitation shifts ownership but not location of production.
IPR reforms were not explicitly discuss in the above mentioned models. To analyze
the debate between North and South about the enforcement of stronger IPRs in the
South, Helpman (1993) employs a simpliﬁed version of the Grossman and Helpman
(1991) model with exogenous imitation. His main contribution is analyzing the transi-
tion dynamics between steady states following tightened IPRs in the South (modeled
as a decrease in the exogenous imitation intensity): stronger IPRs initially raises the
rate of innovation, but the rate of innovation subsequently declines. At the end of his
paper he introduces FDI in a model with exogenous innovation and imitation. Lai
(1998) modiﬁes Helpman’s model to consider the eﬀects of imitation targeting multi-
national production on innovation. He considers two possible channels of production
transfers between North and South: FDI and imitation. The eﬀects of stronger IPR
in South (modeled as a decrease in the exogenous imitation intensity) depend on the
channel of production transfer. In the case of technology transfer through imitation
(without FDI), stronger IPR lowers the rate of innovation. The eﬀects are opposite
if the transfer channel is FDI, or if both transfer channels coexist (and the rate of
FDI is large). If the technology transfer is made through FDI, southern ﬁrms can
imitate only after Northern ﬁrms transfer production to the South. Northern ﬁrms
move production to the South in order to take advantage of lower labor costs. In
this case the eﬀect of stronger IPR does not aﬀect the demand for Northern labor
as production is entirely in the South. This will cause innovation to raise without
an increase in innovation costs. Lai’s (1998) results change when innovation, imita-
tion and oﬀshoring are endogenously determined within the model and the Southern
labor supply is divided between skilled and unskilled labor. Glass and Saggi (2002)
question the results of Lai (1998) where stronger Southern IPR protection encourage
FDI and innovation. They employ a quality-ladder model and argue that stronger
Southern IPR protection reduces the aggregate rate of innovation and the ﬂow of FDI
5regardless of whether FDI or imitation targeting Northern production serves as the
primary channel of international technology transfer. In their model, stronger IPR
protection is an increase in the cost of imitation. Glass and Saggi (2002) conclude that
the reason for the diﬀerence in their results relative to Lai (1998) appears to be the
diﬀerence in how IPR protection was modeled: as an increase in the cost of imitation
rather than as an exogenous decrease in the imitation intensity. But there is another
important diﬀerence between the two models: the type of innovation (creating new
varieties versus quality upgrading) . Glass and Wu (2007) look at how diﬀerences
in the type of innovation aﬀect the consequences of stronger IPR. Their model is
based on the quality-ladder model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
it assumes imitation to be exogenous. They found that stronger IPR in the South
(decrease in the imitation intensity) decrease FDI and innovation, an opposite re-
sult to the one found by Lai (1998) where innovation targeted new varieties. They
conclude that stronger IPR protection may shift the composition of innovation away
from improvements in existing products toward development of new products. The
newest extension to the Grossman and Helpman (1991) model is done by Branstet-
ter, Fisman, Foley and Saggi (2007). They analyze theoretically and empirically the
eﬀects of strengthening IPRs in developing countries in a product variety model with
endogenous innovation, imitation, and FDI. The model predicts that IPR reform in
the South leads to increased FDI in the North, increased global rate of innovation
and a reduction in imitation rate. On the empirical part they analyze responses of
U.S.-based multinationals and domestic industrial production to IPR reforms in the
1980s and 1990s. They ﬁnd that there is an overall expansion of industrial activity
after IPR reform, suggesting that the expansion of multinational activity more than
oﬀsets any decline in the imitative activity of indigenous ﬁrms. Later, Branstetter
and Saggi (2010) studied the eﬀect of IPR protection with endogeneous FDI. An in-
novation process is took placed in the North. They found that a strengtening of IPR
protection in the South reduces the rate of imitation and it increases the ﬂow of FDI
and rate of innovation.
Since there has not been any paper that studies about innovation oﬀshoring, the
eﬀect of improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring is neglected. The model
of this paper extends the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991) by developing a
dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous imitation and innovation, and
production oﬀshoring. I theoretically analyze the strengthening of IPR protection















Figure 2: Model Structure
and improvement of innovation oﬀshoring on the rate of innovation oﬀshoring, the
rate of imitation, the rate of innovation, relative wages, real wages and welfare.
Interestingly, this paper shows that when an innovation oﬀshoring regime ex-
ists a straightening IPR protection decreases the rate of innovation and the rate of
production. From a welfare perspective, the North may hurt while the South may
beneﬁt from this policy. These results are diﬀerent from the previous literatures.
Whereas, an improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring can increase the
rates of innovation imitation. Thus, both the North and the South can beneﬁt from
this phenomenon.
The structure of this paper is as follows. A basic model is presented in section
2. The eﬀects of the strengthening IPR protection are shown in section 3.1 and the
eﬀects of an improvement of technology innovation oﬀshoring are shown in section
3.2. Finally, the concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.
2 Basic Model
Figure 2 shows the structure of the world economy. There are two countries in
the world - the North N and the South S; and both countries freely trade their
diﬀerentiated products which are invented in both countries and only imitated in the
7South. Labor is the only factor of production in each country. It is intersectorally
mobile but internationally immobile.
2.1 Consumer Behavior



















where Ei(τ),Ii(τ),Di(τ) and Ai(τ) are the instantaneous expenditure, the instanta-
neous income, the instantaneous utility and the current value of assets at time τ of
the representative consumer in the ith country for i = N,S. ρ and ri are the rate of
time preference and the nominal interest rate in the ith country, respectively.















where 0 < α < 1, n and xi(j) stand for the number of products and the amount of
the jth variety consumed by the representative consumer in the country i.
Solving the optimization problem we obtain the following instantaneous demand







where ε = 1
1−α > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between two goods
and E = EN + ES is the world total expenditure.
8We also obtain the following optimal time path of expenditure2
˙ Ei
Ei = r
i − ρ (5)
Nominal consumption expenditure grows at a rate equal to the diﬀerence between
the interest rate and the subjective rate of time preference. Assume perfect capital
mobility, so rN = rS = r.
2.2 Product Market
There are 3 types of ﬁrms producing goods: Domestic innovation and production
Northern ﬁrms (D), Oﬀshored innovation and production ﬁrms (O) and imitative
Southern ﬁrms(S) as referred later as domestic, oﬀshoring and Southern ﬁrms, re-
spectively. Northern ﬁrms have an option to innovate and produce in the North or
the South. A ﬁrm requires one unit of labor to produce a unit of output in the North
and it requires ξ > 1 units of labor to produce a unit of output in the South. ξ can
be interpreted as the coordination costs, monitoring costs or operating of production
processes in unfamiliar foreign environment.
Innovation oﬀshoring activity generates a problem of information or knowledge
leakage to a Southern ﬁrms. This information leakage cannot be monitored by the
ﬁrms or veriﬁed by a third party such as a court law. Each ﬁrm completes each
other according to Bertrand price competition fashion and all goods are freely traded
internationally.
The monopoly proﬁts of the representative domestic ﬁrm and the oﬀshoring ﬁrm













where pj is a price level of jth variety and wN and wS are Northern and Southern
wages, respectively.
Given the constant elasticity demand function, the monopoly price are marks-ups
2Its derivation is omitted because it is similar to that in Grossman and Helpman(1991b).











Southern ﬁrms can produce only those goods that they have successfully imitated
and they need one labor to produce a unit of goods. Assume ξα < 1, the narrow-
gap case, the Southern producer enjoys a relatively small cost advantage over its
Northern rival. In this case, if the Southern ﬁrm were to charge the monopoly price,
the oﬀshoring ﬁrm could probably undercut and force the Southern ﬁrm’s sale to zero.
If successful in imitating an oﬀshoring ﬁrm, the Southern imitator sets a limit price
at the level of (or just below) its competitor’s cost.3 Therefore the Southern ﬁrm’s





S = (ξ − 1)w
Sx
S (11)
Let xj denote the good that ﬁrm j where j = D,O or S can sale. We know from



























3When ξα > 1, the Southern imitator charges its optimal monopoly price. However, the main
results would not change.
102.3 Innovation, Imitation and Oﬀshoring
At time t there are n goods existing in the world, among which nD goods are innovated
and produced domestically, nO goods have been internationalized by oﬀshoring their
innovation and production processes to the South and nS are goods produced by
Southern imitators. Let nSO = nO + nS denote all goods that their innovation or
imitation and production are performed in the South. n = nN +nO +nS denotes the
total number of varieties in this economy.




i.e. Υ denotes the rate of increase of the number of oﬀshoring ﬁrms relative to the
total number of goods produced by domestic ﬁrms. In other words, at each point of
time, the number of goods produced by oﬀshoring ﬁrms increases by ΥnN.




i.e. m denotes the rate of increase of the number of imitated goods relative to the total
number of goods produced by oﬀshoring ﬁrms. Because the products of oﬀshoring
ﬁrms are targeted for imitation by Southern ﬁrms, imitation transfers ownership of a
good from oﬀshoring ﬁrms to a Southern imitators.4A southern ﬁrm has no incentive
to imitate each other because its costs and price setting are the same.
On balance growth path or in a steady state equilibrium in which prices, nominal


















and g,nN/n,nO/nand nSO/n are constant over time. We can calculate the steady








































2.3.1 Value of Firms
Once a domestic ﬁrm has mastered the technology for some products, it earns an
inﬁnite stream of oligopoly proﬁts. The owner of the domestic ﬁrm collects proﬁts
πDdt in a time interval of length dt. The total return on equity claims must equal the




Equations (5) and (18) imply that in steady state the interest rate equals the sum
of the subjective discount rate and the growth rate :
r = ρ + g (25)
Thus, from equations (24) and (25), the expected present discounted lifetime value






An oﬀshoring ﬁrm holding the blueprint for a product that has not yet been copied
earns proﬁts πOdt during the interval of length dt. This ﬁrm faces an ongoing risk that
its products will be selected by a Southern entrepreneur as the target for imitation.
In an interval of length dt, ˙ nSdt products will be copied. With random selection a
given ﬁrm will lose its monopoly position during such an interval with probability
˙ nSdt/nO. In such event, the owner of the oﬀshoring ﬁrm suﬀers a capital loss of size
12vO. The arbitrage condition for the oﬀshoring ﬁrm that is the equality between the











ρ + m + g
(28)
We can see that the proﬁts of the oﬀshoring ﬁrm is discounted by the eﬀective rate
interest rate (r + ρ) but also by the rate of imitation (m). This is because imitation
targets only oﬀshoring ﬁrms. However, in reality Northern ﬁrms that domestically
innovate and produce at the North have also a probability to be imitated but this
risk of imitation is lower than domestic ﬁrms. For simplicity, I assume that this risk
become zero. Therefore, domestic ﬁrms have an option of innovation and production
in the North or in the South. To innovate and produce in the South, ﬁrms pay lower
relative wages (Southern wages are lower than Northern wages in equilibrium as I
will show later) but they confront with the risk of imitation depending on the rate of
information leakage and the stock of knowledge in the South.
Next, I will consider the value of a Southern ﬁrm. Once a Southern ﬁrm suc-
cessfully imitates oﬀshoring ﬁrm’s products, it earns an inﬁnite stream of oligopoly
proﬁts. Southern ﬁrm’s owners receive proﬁts πdt in a time interval of length dt.










2.3.2 Costs of Innovation and Imitation
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), the costs of innovation by a domestic ﬁrm









I is the cost parameter of innovation in the North, 1/n captures the spillover
eﬀect of knowledge generated on eﬃciency of current innovation. In other words,
the eﬃciency of product development in the North increases with n, which is proxy
for the cumulative knowledge generated as by-products of all past innovations in the
North.
The costs of innovation oﬀshored to the South can be modeled as the same fashion
as the costs of innovation in the North but an oﬀshoring ﬁrm pays Southern wages wS
and costs aO










I is the cost parameter of innovation in the South. Assume aD
I < aO
I .
Intuitively, this is due to the costs of operating and conducting an innovation in
unfamiliar foreign environments.
The imitation activity in the South is an investment activity similar to the inno-
vation. Because in reality it requires managerial talent, scientists, and technicians,
much like any other type of research. The South can gain the ability to produce an
existing variety by devoting aS/γnSO units of labor to the task of imitation. Here nSO
represents the number of technologies that the South has already acquired. In the
other words, nSO is the number of products innovated, imitated and produced in the
South. Innovation oﬀshoring generates a problem information leakage to Southern
ﬁrms. 0 < γ < 1 captures the degree of information or knowledge leakage to the
South. We can interpret that a lower in γ is a strengthening of IPR protection in the













I . Intuitively, the labor required for imitation is less than
newly invent a goods.
142.4 Free Entry into Innovation in North and South and Im-
itation
Free entry and proﬁt maximization imply that the expected lifetime present value
of domestic and oﬀshoring ﬁrms must be equal to the costs of innovation. Also, the







































Substituting proﬁt functions of each type of ﬁrms into equation (34)- (36) gives the



















(ξ − 1)γnSO (39)
From equation (34) and (35), we can calculate relative wages as follows,
wN
wS = ω =
￿
aO
I ξε−1(m + ρ + g)
aD






I and ξ > 1. Northern relative wages are always greater than
one. They have a positive relationship with the production disadvantage caused by
coordination and monitoring diﬃculties faced by oﬀshoring ﬁrms (ξ), costs parame-
ter of oﬀshoring innovation relative to domestic innovation (aO
I /aD
I ) and the rate of
imitation (m) because they discourage domestic ﬁrms to oﬀshore to the South. This
reluctance to shift innovation and production processes to the South. They implicitly
increase Northern labor demand and ﬁnally relative wages.



























































Intuitively, this condition follows the assumption of free entry into imitation and
innovation and it ensures that no activities lead to excess proﬁts for the ﬁrms that
are successful in such activities.
2.5 Labor Markets
In the North domestic ﬁrms demand nDxD units of labor for manufacturing while
aD










where LN is the supply of labor in the North. Similarly nSxS units of labor used
for manufacturing of Southern goods, while aS ˙ nS/γnSO are engaged in imitation.
Moreover, ξnOxO units of labor used for manufacturing for oﬀshoring Northern ﬁrms
and aO ˙ nO/n are engaged in an innovation activity of oﬀshoring northern ﬁrms in the





























=   (g,m) 
Figure 3: Equilibrium value of rate of innovation oﬀshoring (Υ), rate of imitation (m)
and rate of innovation (g)











































So far we get three equilibrium conditions, equations (43), (44) and (45), to solve
for the steady state equilibrium of rate of innovation oﬀshoring (Υ), the rate of
imitation (m) and the rate of innovation (g).
We can draw the relationship among the three equilibrium variables in ﬁgure 3.
17Northern labor market constraint is upward sloping in the (g,m) space. Since a
higher rate of imitation means a higher risk of being copied and a higher number of
Southern ﬁrms relative to number of domestic ﬁrms (see equation (21)). The decrease
in a number of domestic ﬁrms lowers demand for manufacturing domestic goods in
the North. Thus, there has more Northern labor resources available for an innovation
activity in the North. The rate of innovation increases. It generates the property
that Northern labor market constraint is upward sloping.
Southern labor market constraint is downward sloping in the (g.m) space. In other
words, since the South has only a ﬁxed amount of labor resources, an increase in the
Southern rate of imitation m implies that labors required for imitation activity and
production of imitative Southern products increase. Then, Southern labors available
for innovation in the South are lower. The rate of innovation g that can be supported
by the global economy must be lower.5
The free entry condition constraint showing an equilibrium relationship between
g and Υ is upward sloping. Intuitively, from equation (20) and (21), the higher the
rate of innovation the lower share of products innovated and produced by oﬀshoring
ﬁrms including products imitated by Southern ﬁrms (nSO). Moreover, from equation
(40), it decreases relative wages so as the value of domestic ﬁrm relative to Southern
ﬁrms. To balance the equation (43), the rate of innovation oﬀshoring has to increase.
For a unique steady state equilibrium to exist, the LN and LS curves must have
a unique intersection in the (g,m) space. I show that LN curve has a monotonic
upward sloping and LS has a monotonic downward sloping. So the two curves must
intersect each other at only one point.6
2.6 Welfare
Next, I will consider Northern and Southern welfare. The instantaneous utility func-












where Ei is per capita income in the i. The North derives its income from total
revenues of domestic ﬁrms and operating proﬁts of oﬀshoring ﬁrms minus innova-
5The mathematical proof of slopes is in the appendix.
6The mathematical proof of existence of equilibrium is in the appendix.
18tion costs. The proﬁts of oﬀshoring ﬁrms are generated from oﬀshoring companies
whose products have not been imitated, and they equal a fraction (1−α) of revenue.
Therefore, Northern income equals
E
N =














(1 − α)pOnOxO(1 − 1
ρ+g+m)
pDnDxD ] (52)























In the South gross income equals revenues from the Southern ﬁrms and incomes from
hiring Southern labors to innovate and produce goods by oﬀshoring ﬁrms. Therefore
Southern gross income is
E
S =













































3 Comparative Steady State Eﬀects
3.1 Eﬀects of Strengthening IPR Protection
The objective of this section is to study how a strengthening IPR protection in the
South, as captured by a decrease in the rate of information leakage γ, aﬀects relative
wages (ω), the rate of innovation (g), the rate of imitation (m), and the rate of
innovation oﬀshoring (Υ). The eﬀects of strengthening IPR protection can be shown
by ﬁgure 4.
From equation (46), a decrease in parameter γ indirectly aﬀects the Northern
labor constraint via its eﬀect on the rate of innovation oﬀshoring (Υ). A decrease in
γ increases the costs of imitation. This immediately implies that the rate of imitation
decreases. As a result, an oﬀshoring ﬁrm faces a lower risk to be copied, its expected
returns increase. The rate of innovation oﬀshoring increases (Υ curve shifts upward
in ﬁgure 4b). The increase in Υ decreases labor demand in the North in all activities
(i.e. innovation and production by domestic ﬁrms). This is equivalent to an outward
shift in Northern labor market constraint in the (g,m) space.
On the other hand, from equation (47), the decrease in γ aﬀects Southern labor
constraint in two ways: direct and indirect. The direct way is that it increases labor
demand in the South in three activities (i.e. production by oﬀshoring ﬁrms and
Southern ﬁrms and imitation activity). The indirect way is from the increase in the
rate of innovation oﬀshoring. It increases the Southern labor demand for innovation
by oﬀshoring ﬁrms. Thus, Southern labor market constraint shifts inward. As a result
of these two forces eﬀecting the LS curve, LS relatively shifts higher than the shift of
LN. Therefore, the eﬀect of a strengthening IPR protection on equilibrium rates of
innovation oﬀshoring, imitation and innovation can be derived as follows,
Proposition 1 A strengthening of IPR protection decreases the rate of innovation
and the rate of imitation but increases the rate of innovation oﬀshoring.


















=   (g,m) 
1=   1(g,m) 
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Eﬀects of Strengthening IPR Protection
21Intuitively, a strengthen of IPR protection decreases Northern labor demand but
increases Southern labor demand. Therefore, relative Northern wages decrease. As
a result of a strengthen IPR protection and decrease in relative wages, the costs
of imitation increase. Southern ﬁrms loss from imitation activity so they exit the
market. Then, the rate of imitation decreases. The lower in the rate of imitation
Increases an incentive for oﬀshoring ﬁrms to place both innovation and production
activities in the South since they face a lower risk of being copied. Thus, Northern
ﬁrms attempt to oﬀshore more. The number of oﬀshoring ﬁrms relative to domestic
ﬁrms increases. So the rate of innovation oﬀshoring rises.
When the production reallocates from domestic to oﬀshoring ﬁrms, the labours
available for an innovation activity in the North increase so the rate of innovation of
domestic ﬁrms increases. On the other hand, a higher demand for imitation reduces
the labor supply available for innovation of oﬀshoring ﬁrms. So, the rate of innovation
in the South for oﬀshoring ﬁrms decreases. Note that the gross rate of innovation is
weighted average between the rate of innovation from domestic and oﬀshoring ﬁrms.
The weighted index is the share of number of each ﬁrm in the total number of ﬁrms in
the economy. As the result of the decrease in a number of domestic ﬁrms and increase
in those of oﬀshoring ﬁrms, the rate of innovation decreases because the decrease in
an innovation of oﬀshoring ﬁrms in the South dominates the increase in an innovation
of domestic ﬁrms in the North.
Next, we will study the eﬀects of a strengthening of IPR protection on real wages
in the North and the South. The real wage eﬀect of a strengthening of IPR pro-
tection depends on nominal wages in the North and the South and prices of goods
produced by three types of ﬁrms: domestic ﬁrms(D), oﬀshoring ﬁrms(O) and south-












22We can calculate Northern real wages in terms of the three types of goods as follows,
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In other words, Northern real wages in terms of goods produced by domestic ﬁrms
are unaﬀected by Southern IPR protection whereas in terms of the other two goods,
they move in the same direction as Northern relative wages (ω). Consider now the















In other words, only Southern real wages in terms of Northern goods innovated and
produced in the South are aﬀected. The Southern real wages in terms of oﬀshoring
innovation and production ﬁrms’ price increases. We can now state the following:
Proposition 2 A strengthening of IPR protection decreases Northern real wages but
increases Southern real wages.
Next, we will study the eﬀects of the strengthening of IPR protection to the price
index and Northern and Southern domestic welfare. I conducted a series of numerical
simulations. Table 1 reports the results of one such typical simulation. Assuming the
following parameter values: LN = 170, LS = 150, aS
M = 2.8, aD
I = 3.0, aO
I =3.5, ρ =
0.01, α = 0.5, ε= 2, ξ = 1.3.
According to table 1, the simulation shows that as IPR in the South is strength-
ening, the measure of goods produced by domestic ﬁrms (nD) decreases, the measure









wS logEN logES logP W N W S
1.0 0.37 0.21 0.42 3.15 0.57 0.45 0.34 23 11
0.8 0.26 0.33 0.41 3.07 0.62 0.49 0.37 25 12
0.6 0.19 0.51 0.3 2.91 0.55 0.55 0.41 14 14
0.4 0.15 0.62 0.23 2.33 0.52 0.65 0.49 3 16
0.2 0.13 0.72 0.15 2.07 0.59 0.74 0.57 2 17
Table 1: Eﬀects of Strengthening IPR protection
products (nS) decreases. Relative wage decreases, the price index increase and North-
ern domestic welfare decreases, while Southern welfare increases.
Proposition 3 A strengthening of IPR protection may hurt the North but beneﬁt the
South.
The intuition underlying the results is as follows: A strengthening of IPR protec-
tion makes imitation less attractive, thereby lowing the rate of imitation. A lower
risk of imitation makes oﬀshoring activity in the South more attractive to oﬀshoring
ﬁrms which respond by increasing the rate of innovation oﬀshoring. It can translate
into a greater share of goods produced by oﬀshoring ﬁrms of the world’s basket of
goods (nO/n), while the share of goods produced by domestic ﬁrms and Southern
ﬁrms of the world’s basket of goods (nD/n and nS/n) fall.
While goods produced by oﬀshoring ﬁrms are cheaper than those produced by
domestic ﬁrms (pO < pS), it is Southern imitators that produce the cheapest goods
(pS < pO). Recall that a strengthening of IPR protection shifts production away
from domestic ﬁrms and Southern imitators to oﬀshoring ﬁrms, the reallocation of
production from domestic ﬁrms to oﬀshoring ﬁrms helps lower price, while the real-
location of southern production in favor of oﬀshoring ﬁrms’ products and away from
Southern imitators tends to increase prices. From the numerical simulation in table
1, it implies that the latter eﬀect is substantial so the price index decreases when an
IPR protection is stronger.
From the results of numerical simulation, we found that Northern welfare de-
creases. The intuition is as follows: a strengthening of IPR protection increases proﬁts
of oﬀshoring ﬁrms but decreases income from domestic ﬁrms and increases innovation
costs in the South. When an IPR protection is still weak an increase in proﬁts of
oﬀshoring ﬁrms is outweighed by a decrease in incomes from domestic ﬁrms and an
24increase in innovation costs so Northern income decreases. Once an IPR protection
is stronger, a decrease in incomes from domestic ﬁrms and an increase in innovation
costs are outweighed so Northern income is higher. As the results of increase in price
index and change of Northern income, so the instantaneous real income decreases. It
means Northern welfare decreases.
On the other hand, Southern welfare increases. the South generates income from
two sources: income from selling imitated goods and from hiring Southern labor of
oﬀshoring ﬁrms. Recall that a strengthening of IPR protection decreases the share
of imitated goods of the world’s basket so the income from imitated goods decreases,
while it increases the rate of oﬀshoring so the income from hiring of oﬀshoring ﬁrms
to innovate and produce products increases. The former eﬀect is less than the latter
eﬀect so Southern income increases. The rate of increase in price index is less than
that of Southern income, then Southern welfare increases.
For simplicity, we can interpret in another way. Both countries’s welfare are
derived from two sources: real wages and varieties consumers in both countries can
consume. A strengthening of IPR protection decreases Northern real wages and
varieties so Northern welfare decreases. In the South, Southern real wages increase
but varieties decrease. The latter eﬀect is outweighed by the former eﬀect so Southern
welfare increases.
3.2 Eﬀects of an Improvement in Technology of Innovation
Oﬀshoring
Changes in corporate innovation management as well as by the globalization of mar-
kets for technology and knowledge workers make an innovation oﬀshoring more con-
venient. In other words, a technology of innovation oﬀshoring improves. This section
investigates the eﬀects of an improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring, as
captured by a decrease in parameter aO
I , on relative wages (ω), the rate of innovation
(g), the rate of imitation (m), the rate of innovation oﬀshoring (Υ) and Northern
and Southern welfare. The eﬀects of an improvement in the technology of innovation
oﬀshoring can be shown by ﬁgure 5.
From equation (46), same as a decrease in parameter γ in the previous section ,
a decrease in parameter aO
I indirectly aﬀects Northern labor constraint via its eﬀect
on the rate of innovation oﬀshoring (Υ). A decrease in aO
I reduces the costs of
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of Improvement in Technology of Innovation Oﬀshoring
26innovation at the South for oﬀshoring ﬁrms. The expected returns of oﬀshoring
ﬁrms become higher than the costs of innovation at the South so ﬁrms do oﬀshoring
increasingly. It implies that a number of oﬀshoring ﬁrms increases and the rate of
oﬀshoring increases (Υ curve shifts upward in ﬁgure 5b). An increase in Υ decreases
labor demand in the North in all activities (i.e. innovation and production by domestic
ﬁrms). Northern labor market constraint shifts outward (from Ln to L0
n) in the
(g,m) space. Moreover, from equation (47), a decrease in aO
I aﬀects Southern labor
constraint via labor demand for innovation of oﬀshoring ﬁrms in two opposite ways
. It directly decreases Southern labor demand whereas an increase in the rate of
innovation oﬀshoring increases the Southern demand. However, the former eﬀect is
greater than the latter eﬀect so the Southern demand for innovation of oﬀshoring
ﬁrms decreases. Southern labor demand constraint shifts outward (from Ls to L0
s).
Therefore, the eﬀect of an improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring on
equilibrium rates of innovation oﬀshoring, imitation and innovation can be derived as
follows,
Proposition 4 The eﬀect of an improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring
increases the rate of innovation, the rate of imitation and the rate of innovation
oﬀshoring.
Intuitively, an improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring decreases in-
novation costs of oﬀshoring ﬁrms at the South. An incentive for performing product
development in the South has risen. This implies the rate of innovation oﬀshoring
increases. A ﬂow of oﬀshoring ﬁrms which oﬀshore both innovation and production
to the South increases a stock of Southern knowledge. This reduces costs of imita-
tion, so the rate of imitation increases. It induces Southern labor demand relative to
Northern labor demand to increase and pressures relative Northern wages to decrease
(from equation (40)). As a result of an increase in the rate of oﬀshoring, there are
much more available labors left for an innovation activity in the North. Moreover, an
innovation activity in the South is more proﬁtable because the costs of innovation at
the South decrease. An increase of an innovation activity in the North and the South
makes the rate of innovation higher.
Next, we will study the eﬀects of improvement in a technology of innovation
oﬀshoring on real wages. As we have already known, relative Northern wages decrease.










wS logEN logES logP W N W S
3.5 0.17 0.54 0.29 2.86 0.63 0.55 0.41 22 14
3.4 0.15 0.55 0.30 2.83 0.66 0.57 0.38 28 19
3.3 0.12 0.57 0.31 2.77 0.69 0.60 0.36 33 24
3.2 0.09 0.59 0.32 2.74 0.72 0.62 0.33 39 29
3.1 0.04 0.62 0.34 2.70 0.75 0.65 0.28 47 37
Table 2: An improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring
Southern ﬁrm product’s price move in the same direction as Northern relative wages
(ω), while Southern real wages in terms of domestic ﬁrm product’s price move in the
opposite direction as the Northern relative wages. We can derive the eﬀects of an
improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring on real wages as follows:
Proposition 5 An improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring decreases
Northern real wages but increases Southern real wages.
Next, we will investigate the eﬀect of improvement in technology of innovation
oﬀshoring on the price index and both countries’ domestic welfare. The results of
numerical simulation are shown in the table 27
According to table 2, this simulation shows that as the technology for innovation
oﬀshoring has improved, the measure of goods produced by domestic ﬁrms (nD)
decreases, the measure of goods produced by oﬀshoring ﬁrms (nO) and the measure
of imitated products (nS) increases relative wages decrease, the price index decreases,
and Northern domestic welfare and Southern domestic welfare both increase.
Proposition 6 An improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring may beneﬁt
the North and the South.
The intuition underlying the results is as follows: an improvement in technology
of innovation oﬀshoring lowers costs of innovation at the South so it makes innova-
tion oﬀshoring more attractive, thereby higher the rate of innovation oﬀshoring. It
means the share of goods produced by oﬀshoring ﬁrms of the world’s basket of goods
increases, while those of domestic ﬁrms decreases . Moreover, an increase in a number
of oﬀshoring ﬁrms lowers the costs of imitation. It implies that the share of goods
7Assuming the following parameter values : γ = 1.6,LN = 170, LS = 150, aS
M = 2.8, aD
I = 3.0,
aO
I =3.5, ρ = 0.01, α = 0.5, ε= 2, θ = 1.3.
28produced by Southern ﬁrms of the world’s basket of goods (nS/n) increases. Recall
that pS < pO < pD, the reallocation of production from domestic ﬁrms to oﬀshoring
ﬁrms and Southern ﬁrms helps lower the price index. From now on , I will consider the
change in both countries’ income per capita. Northern income per capita increases
since a decrease in income from domestic ﬁrms is outweighed by an increase income
from oﬀshoring ﬁrms and costs of innovation in the South also decrease. Southern
income per capita also increases because an increase in incomes from imitators and
wage bills paid by oﬀshoring ﬁrms. As Northern and Southern income capita increase
and the price index decreases, both countries’ real income per capita increase. This
implies welfare of both countries increases. On the other hand, I can say that a loss
from an decrease in Northern real wages is outweighed by a beneﬁt from a rising
in varieties. The Northern welfare improves. Whereas, an increase in Southern real
wages and varieties make Southern welfare increase.
4 Concluding Remarks
Innovation oﬀshoring plays a prominent role in the current world economy. Media
now report an innovation oﬀshoring in sectors ranging from pharmaceutical and bio-
technology to computer hardware and software. An increasing number refers to wholly
owned innovation centers in countries such as Russia, China, and India, or sometimes
even arms length sub-contracting of innovation in these countries. Five powerful forces
are currently driving the innovation revolution – lower wage rates, higher demand,
increase in the supply of scientists, technologists and knowledge workers, growth in
interaction capabilities and new incentives in developing countries. Therefore, the
understanding of this emerging new forms of international trade and cross-border
businesses are important to highlight.
This paper I have studied a two-region world economy with an industrialized
North and a middle-income South. The product development can take place in both
the North and the South. In this model, innovation and production are adhered
together to be oﬀshored to the South. To oﬀshore innovation, oﬀshoring ﬁrms have
to pay monitoring costs and face the problem of information of product leakage to
the Southern ﬁrms. That means oﬀshoring ﬁrms face a risk of being imitated. While,
a production oﬀshoring generates costs of coordinating decisions over large distances
and operating in unfamiliar environments. In the less advanced region, by contrast,
29entrepreneurs devote resources to the tasks of learning and adapting technologies that
have been developed in the North and the South.
The eﬀects of strengthening IPR protection in the South and improvement in
the technology of innovation oﬀshoring on the rate of innovation, rate of imitation,
rate of innovation oﬀshoring, relative wages, real wages and welfare are investigated.
To answer the research questions, I introduced innovation and production oﬀshoring
into Grossman and Helpman (1991) model with endogenous innovation and imitation.
Previous authors who employed the Grossman and Helpman model in order to analyze
the eﬀects of stronger IPR and the technology of innovation oﬀshoring were more
interested in determining the rate of imitation and in the steady state equilibrium
without investigating the eﬀects of existence of innovation and production oﬀshoring.
The major results of the eﬀect of strengthening IPR protection are as follows.
The strengthening IPR protection directly increases the costs of imitation so it dis-
courages imitation in the South. A fall in imitation make risks of being copied of
oﬀshoring ﬁrms declines. Thus, it induces Northern ﬁrms to oﬀshore innovation to
the South. The number of oﬀshoring ﬁrms relative to domestic ﬁrms increases. It
is implied that the rate of innovation oﬀshoring rises. As the results a decline in
imitation, the relative demand for Southern labor increases because the South a more
attractive location for oﬀshoring ﬁrms. Northern real wages decrease, while South-
ern real wages increase. Domestic welfare of each country is derived from real per
capita income. Prices of those goods that are reallocated from domestic ﬁrms to
oﬀshoring ﬁrms fall, prices of goods that are reallocated from imitators to oﬀshoring
ﬁrms increase. Due to the model’s underlying complexity, I have analyzed the results
by numerical simulation. The numerical results found that, for speciﬁc parameter
values the price index increases because the eﬀectof reallocation from domestic ﬁrms
to oﬀshoring ﬁrms dominates those of reallocation from imitators to oﬀshoring ﬁrms.
Northern income changes in U-shape because the increase in proﬁts of oﬀshoring
ﬁrms is outweighed by the decreases income from domestic ﬁrms in the ﬁrst stage of
strengthening IPR protection but it reverses later. Both eﬀects on the price index
and income per capita make Northern welfare decrease. While, per capita income of
the South derived from the incomes of imitators and wage bills paid by oﬀshoring
ﬁrms increases, so the Southern welfare increases.
The eﬀects of an improvement in technology of innovation oﬀshoring are as follows.
The improvement decreases innovation costs of oﬀshoring ﬁrms at the South and the
30rate of innovation oﬀshoring rises. The increase in the rate of innovation oﬀshoring
implies that the increase in the number of oﬀshoring ﬁrms. This enlarges the stock of
Southern knowledge so the costs of imitation increase. Both a demand from oﬀshoring
ﬁrms and an imitation activity in the South increase the relative Southern labor
demand so relative Northern wages decrease.
There are more labors available for an innovation activity of domestic ﬁrms since
oﬀshoring ﬁrms move their innovation and production processes to the South. More-
over, an innovation in the South of oﬀshoring ﬁrms also increases since the costs of
innovation fall. Therefore, the rate of innovation increases.
Northern income per capita increases since a decrease in income from domestic
ﬁrms is outweighed by an increase income from oﬀshoring ﬁrm and costs of innovation
in The South also decrease. Southern income per capita also increases due to the fact
that incomes from imitators and wage bills paid oﬀshoring ﬁrms increase. The price
index decreases since the reallocation of production from domestic ﬁrms to oﬀshoring
ﬁrms and Southern ﬁrms As a result of the eﬀects on the price index and per capital
income , both countries’ welfare increase .
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof for upward slope of LN




























I can calculate Υ as the function of g and m as following.
Υ =
aS
Mg2(1 − α)α￿ξ(g + ρ)
(g + m)(aS
M(α − 1)α￿ξ(g + ρ) + aO
I αγ(ξ − 1)(g + m + ρ))
For positive value of Υ , the second parenthesis of denominator that is aS
M(α −
1)α￿ξ(g + ρ) + aO
I αγ(ξ − 1)(g + m + ρ) must be greater than zero or
g <
aS
M(α − 1)α￿ξρ + aO
I αγ(ξ − 1)(m + ρ)
aO
I αγ(ξ − 1) + aS
M(α − 1)α￿ξ
31From equation (46), we know that LN = LN(g,m,Υ(g,m)). Thus the slope of LN
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5.2 Proof for upward slope of LS
From equation 47, we know that LS = LS(g,m,Υ(g,m)). Thus the slope of LS in
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325.3 Existence of Equilibrium
The LN curve intersects the vertical axes at mN where
m
N ≡





Similarly, the LS curve intersects the vertical axis at mS where
m
S ≡
ξLSγ(ξ − 1) − aS
Mξρ −
p
ξ2(LSγ − LSγξ + aS
Mρ)2
2(LS(γ − γξ) + aS
Mρ)
.
Since mN < mS and LN is upward sloping, while LS is downward sloping, the two
curves must intersect each other at once.
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